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ABSTRACT
The wide usage of Machine Learning (ML) leads to direct security
threats, as ML algorithms are vulnerable to a plethora of attacks
themselves. Different attack vectors are known, and target for ex-
ample the training phase using manipulated data. Alternatively, they
take place at test time and aim for miss-classification, the leakage of
the training data or extraction of the model. Previous works studied
different test time attacks individually. We show that using an ML
model enabling formal analysis and allowing control over the deci-
sion surface curvature, interesting insights can be gained when attack
vectors are not studied in isolation but in relation to each pother. We
show for example how we can secure Gaussian Process Classifica-
tion against empirical membership inference by properly configuring
the algorithm. In this configuration, however, the model’s parameters
are leaked. This allows an analytic computation of the the training
data, which is thus leaked, against the original intention of protect-
ing the data. We extend our study to evasion attacks, and find that
analogously, hardening the model against one attack boils down to
enabling a different attacker.
1 INTRODUCTION
The increase of available data and computational power have lead to
a more widespread usage of machine learning (ML) techniques. Yet,
ML algorithms can easily become the target of an attack themselves.
The most famous example are evasion attacks, also called adversarial
examples. A small perturbation is added to a test sample, which is
subsequently missclassified. Examples for targeted systems include,
but are not limited to Malware detectors which then classify Malware
as benign [11, 41], vision for autonomous driving that miss-classifies
traffic signs [40], and robot visual systems [26]. Most defenses for
such evasion attacks are shown to lead to an arms race [3, 7].
Other attackers aim to steal or copy the ML model [31, 44] or
hyper-parameters set for training [30], thereby harming the intellec-
tual property of the owner of the model. Such attacks are referred to
as model stealing or model extraction attacks. Another, yet different
attacker retrieves the data that was used to train the classifier [19, 37],
leading to either a privacy breach for the subjects contributing to
the data and/or the person or company that collected the data. Such
attacks are known as membership inference attacks.
The vulnerability towards these attacks can formally and empir-
ically be studied using Gaussian Process (GP) algorithms. GP are
nonlinear, as are deep neural networks, yet provide the means for
a rigorous analysis: After training, a GP yields a closed form ex-
pression, where classification depends directly on both parameters
learned and the data used during training. Hence, formal reasoning
is more fruitful than for models like deep neural networks which de-
pend largely on randomness. We use this property to analyze evasion,
model stealing, and membership inference.
At the same time, the curvature of the decision function of a GP
can be predetermined before training: choosing a long lengthscale
yields a GP with a flat decision surface, whereas a short lengthscale
leads to a more curvy surface. This gives us the unique opportunity
to study vulnerability towards evasion attacks in context of nonlinear
model curvature. Such a relationship is known for linear models
like support vector machines [36] and used for mitigations in deep
neural networks [18, 33]. We conduct a broad empirical study that
investigates decision surface curvature and vulnerability towards
evasion attacks on GP.
Moreover, a steep curvature of the classification function is are
more likely to fit randomness in the data, and thus overfit. Mem-
bership inference attacks have been found to depend on overfitting
[19]. Such overfitting further often implies high confidence on seen
training data. GPs, instead, are not forced to be overly confident on
the training data, and overfitting can directly controlled by setting
the lengthscale. This yields yet again an ideal setting to study mem-
bership inference attacks on GP. Intriguingly, we further find that
membership inference and model stealing are closely related on GP,
and hence extend our study to model stealing attacks.
More in detail, our contributions are as follows:
• We prove using GP that learning and static security guaran-
tees, such as a fixed, secure radius around each training point,
are opposed. Our analysis also emphasizes the need for a
rejection option in context of robustness. We further show
how many queries an attacker needs to analytically recompute
GP’s training data and parameters.
• To complement our formal work, we conduct a broad em-
pirical study on four security and two computer vision data
sets, this time focusing on curvature of the GP. In evasion
attacks, decision function curvature only changes the kind of
attack that is needed to succeed: Highly optimized attacks
tend to fool a steep curvature, whereas less optimized attacks
are more effective on flat curvature classifiers. In contrast, we
show that the training data can not be empirically determined
iff the GP is properly configured. Then, however, the kernels
parameters are easier to estimate.
• We conclude that attacks on ML algorithms should not be
studied in isolation, but in relationship to each other: mitigat-
ing one attack might enable another, different attack vector.
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Table 1: Notation used throughout the paper.
Notation Meaning
x data point, equivalent notation: Xi
xi feature i in data point x
y label, equivalent notation: Yi
Xtr , Ytr training data
Xt , Yt test data, one individual test point also x ′,x ′′
k(Xi ,X j ) covariance function, K resulting matrix
ρ a particular value of k (threshold)
κ some value of k
B(x , ρ) ball around x with radius ρ, also ρ-ball
y∗ GP’s prediction, predictive mean
p some value of y∗
δ malicious perturbation for data point
ϵ parameter to globally perturb data point
l lengthscale of GP’s covariance (RBF)
2 BACKGROUND
In this section we present all necessary background required for this
paper. We start by introducing classification and Gaussian Processes
(GP), then give a short summary of adversarial learning and finally
summarize our threat model. We list all notations used throughout
this paper in table 1.
In classification, the task is to assign labelsY to some data samples
X . In general, we separate the data into training (Xtr,Ytr) and test
data (Xt,Yt). We then adapt the parameters or weights θ of a classifier
function f on the training data, e.g. f (Xtr,θ ) = Ytr. Our goal is that
f (Xt,θ ) = Yt, or that the classifier predicts correctly on unknown
test data.
2.1 Gaussian Process Classification
We use Gaussian Process Classification (GPC) [34] for two classes
using the Laplace approximation. The goal is to predict the labels
Yt for the test data points Xt accurately. In GP, we use a covariance
function, which is equivalent to a kernel or similarity metric. We
will use those names interchangeably in this paper.
We first introduce Gaussian Process regression (GPR), and as-
sume that the data is produced by a GP and can be represented using
a covariance function k:[
Ytr
Yt
]
= N
(
0,
[
Ktr Ktt
KTtt Kt
] )
, (1)
where Ktr is the covariance of the training data, Kt of the test data,
and Ktt between test and training data. Having represented the data,
we now review how to use this representation for predictions. As
we use a Gaussian model, our predictions are Gaussian too, with a
predictive mean and a predictive variance which we define now. At
a given test point x ′, assuming a Gaussian likelihood function, the
predictive mean y∗ is
y∗t = KTx ′K
−1
tr Ytr , (2)
where KTx ′ is the vector with the distances from x
′ to each training
point.
For brevity, we do not detail the procedure for optimizing the
parameters of the covariance function k that defines our Gaussian
process. Instead, we outline how to alter this regression model to
perform classification. Since our labels Yt are not real valued and
non-Gaussian class labels,
we apply a link function σ (·) that normalizes the output to be in
range [0, 1]. This procedure is called Laplace approximation.
In other words, GP does not learn any explicit weights θ . Instead,
we adapt the covariance metric k to fit the training data. For a given
test point, k weights all training points with their labels, resulting in
the output for this test point.
In the formal analysis, we focus on regression: it is similar to
the latent representation that is used for the prediction in Laplace
approximated classification. More concretely, when the mean of
regression tends towards one class, GPC’s classification will do so
as well. As we are not interested in the strength of a response in our
analysis, we thus skip the additional steps introduced by the link
function σ (·). Finally, whenever we write GP, we refer to properties
that both GPC and GPR share.
2.1.1 Covariance Function. We introduce the most common
similarity metric in GP, the RBF kernel. This metric is defined as
follows
k(x ,x ′) = exp
(
− l |x − x
′ |22
2σ 2
)
, (3)
where the L2 distance between two points is re-scaled by length-
scale l and variance σ 2. These two parameters, σ 2 and l , form the
parameters θ which are adapted during training.
In particular the lengthscale l affects how local the resulting simi-
larity metric is: a small l yields for example a very local classifier
with high decision function curvature. To obtain such a local clas-
sifier, l is set before the training is started, and is then not adapted
during optimization.
More in detail, we can influence how fast the kernel decays by
fixing the lengthscale l . As we use the exponential function, the
output similarity approaches 0 as the (by l re-scaled) distance gets
larger. This property is called abation, and useful for outlier detection
or open set tasks [38]. The faster the similarity abates, the more local
the classifier and the steeper the decision function.
2.2 Adversarial Machine Learning
We now show how our previously described GP can be targeted by
an adversary. First, we describe evasion in general and then introduce
all attacks used in our evaluation. We then briefly comment on other
attacks which are relevant for this paper.
Given a trained classifier f (.,θ ), evasion attacks compute a small
perturbation δ for a sample x such that
δ : f (x ,θ ) , f (x + δ ,θ ) . (4)
In a nutshell, given some metric, we aim to find a perturbation δ that
changes classification. There are two basic constraints here, one is
to minimize δ to be as small as possible. We might, however, also
maximize the difference in classification, to be sure the resulting
example is misclassified when targeting a second classifier f ′. In
general, we distinguish targeted and untargeted attacks. Since we
only evaluate on binary tasks, however, this distinction is superfluous
in this paper.
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Before we detail on the attacks used in this work, we want to
address how to measure δ . We might use the L0 metric which counts
the number of changed features. It is well suited for binary data, such
as Malware features. The L2 metric is equivalent to the euclidean
or squared-root distance, and thus well suited for images. Another
metric for images is the L∞ metric that measures the largest change
introduced.
Many algorithms exist for creating adversarial examples. We
briefly recap the the algorithms that we rely on in our evaluation.
We first review is the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [14]. This
method is formalized as
δ = ϵ × sign(∇x JL(F (x ,θ ))) ,
where ϵ parametrizes the strength of the perturbation. Further, the
gradient of the model’s loss warranted the input x ′ is written as
∇x JL((F (x ,θ ))). FGSM implicitly minimizes the L∞ norm, as the
same change is applied to all features. FGSM has been extended to
SVM in [31] and GPC [17].
Further, we apply the Jacobian-based saliency map approach
(JSMA) [32]. JSMA is based on the derivative of the model’s out-
put with respect to its inputs. Informally, JSMA picks the pixel
for perturbation that maximizes the output for the target class and
minimizes the output for all other classes. This search is executed
iteratively until miss-classification is achieved or a defined threshold
is exceeded. We apply a variant that minimized the L0 on DNN and
GP.
To conclude evasion attacks, we review the Carlini and Wager
or Lx attacks[8]. Here, the task of producing an adversarial example
is formulated as an iterative optimization problem. The authors intro-
duce three attacks, minimizing the L2,L0 and L∞ norm respectively.
The L2 attack is formalized as the following optimization problem
min
δ
∥ 0.5(tanh(δ ) + 1) + x ∥2 +sд(0.5(tanh(δ ) + 1)) ,
where the usage of tanh ensures that the box-constraint is fulfilled.
This box-constraint ensures that no feature is set to higher values
than the normal features values. Further s trades-off the two terms.
The function д represents, in a for confidence parametrized form,
how much the network miss-classifies x ′. Since the L0 norm is non-
differentiable, an iterative attack is proposed where the L2 attacker
is used to determine which features are changed. Analogously, the
L∞ norm is poorly differentiable and hard to optimize. The authors
propose here to use an iterative L2 attacker with a penalty taking
into account the L∞ norm. Many defenses have been introduced to
alleviate the threat of adversarial examples, yet these mitigations are
often insufficient [3, 7].
We now address model stealing [31, 44], model extraction [30]
and then membership inference [19, 37]. The first two attacks
query the model with particular queries to deduce the desired in-
formation. In our work, however, we will show that GP enable an
analytic computation of the targeted parameters and/or data. Mem-
bership inference attacks further exploit differences in confidence
of the model for known and unknown data. In GP, we will use both
confidence (predictive mean) and the predictive variance to deduce
this information. This is a slight variation of the original attacks.
For completeness, we add attacks which alter training data ma-
liciously to change a classifier in the attackers favor [5, 25]. In this
area as well, defenses have been proposed (for example [9]).
2.3 Threat Model
To conclude the background, we specify the adversary that we con-
sider in our study. We consider three different attackers. All operate
at test time, when training is completed. In general, the attacker
might have full knowledge of the model (white-box), where she
can access each parameter of the trained algorithm. The gray-box
setting considers information about the algorithm applied, where the
parameters or weights are unknown. In the black-box model, the
attacker has no knowledge about the targeted model, not even which
algorithm is used.
Analogously, we have to take into account the knowledge the
attacker has about the data. The training data might be fully known.
If access is restricted, the attacker might have learned the kind and/or
the number of features. In a more difficult setting, nothing except
the task is known. In the following, we summarize the attacker by
setting.
Evasion. The formal analysis shows a general contradiction be-
tween learning and security against evasion attacks, which is inde-
pendent from a specific attacker. Given further the results from [17]
and [12] for the vulnerability in white box settings, we investigate
the influence of decision function curvature towards a black-box
attacker concerning the model with full knowledge concerning the
data.
Model Stealing, Model extraction, and Membership Infer-
ence. In a GP, both attacks can be analytically formulated, allowing
to determine the exact number of queries needed given differing
knowledge of the attacker. In the empirical study, we investigate
whether we can speed up the attacks when we leverage learning and
partial knowledge about the data. Concerning the model, we assume
a gray-box attacker who is only aware that a GP is applied. In case of
model stealing, we further consider the training data to be known or
not known (e.g., gray-box or black-box). For membership inference,
we take a different approach: we assume a very strong attacker (in an
effort to study a worst case scenario) who has some labeled training
data from the model. We use this knowledge to study which factors
affect the success of the attacker.
3 FORMAL ANALYSIS OF VULNERABILITY
In this section, we analyze formally the vulnerability towards dif-
ferent attacks using GPR. We start with evasion attacks and then
continue with model stealing and membership inference.
3.1 Evasion Attacks
To start our formal analysis, we define a classifier that cannot be
fooled by an adversarial example or an evasion attack. However, we
first recap the goal of the attacker.
Evasion Attack. Given a classifier f and an instance x of a
class c, find a perturbation δ such that f outputs c ′ , c. A
labeling oracle o however still assigns o(x + δ ) = c.
We will show in the following that a static security guarantee fulfill-
ing this definition is opposed to learning. To proceed, we assume
correctly labeled data, and leave the study of training time attacks
for future work. We further briefly define rejection of a classifier
which we need throughout this analysis. We assume a classifier can
reject a sample, in the sense that it does not assign the given sample
to any predefined class.
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To define the secure classifier, we chose an abating similarity
measure: as the distance from the training data increases, the measure
approaches 0. There is a ρ such that for all training points, iff point
x ′ is in the closed ball B(x , ρ) around a training point x ∈ xtr with
radius ρ, then x ′ cannot be an example of another class than x . In
other words, all points in the ρ-ball around x are of the same class.
We formalize secure classification as
f (x ′) =
{
yi iff x ′ ∈ B(xi , ρ)
reject otherwise
and obtain a secure classifier which cannot be fooled: Changing a
sample enough to be classified as a different class means to alter x ′ so
much that x ′ ∈ B(x j , ρ)whereyi , yj , or according to our definition,
o(xi ) , o(x j ). Then, by our definition, x ′ is a valid instance of this
class and not an adversarial example.
The constant classifier, which can also not be fooled by evasion
attacks, is then a special instance of the classifier described here: The
number of points is one and ρ = ∞. Further, this secure classifier
is equivalent to a 1-nearest-neighbor classifier using a threshold ρ.
Finally, this secure classifier is also equivalent to a GP given the
following conditions:
(1) GP has a rejection option based on ρ.
(2) There is no point x ′ such that for two distinct xi ,x j ∈ xtr
both k(xi ,x ′) > 0 and k(x j ,x ′) > 0.
In other words, we require that GP is able to reject a sample and
assumption two states that the similarity between any two training
points is zero, independent of their class. Given the last assumption
holds, however, the resulting covariance matrix is the identity matrix,
as the similarity between any two points is zero. This covariance
matrix does not allow any learning [27].
We implicitly assume that these assumptions hold as well for the
secure classifier. We may enforce them by deleting training data, for
example. We also implicitly assume that ρ is the same for all training
points. In case of different ρs, we apply the smallest. Further, in the
infinite sample limit, the secure classifier might cover the whole
generating distribution of the data. Our analysis however concerns
a set of finite samples–for the security in the infinite sample limit,
refer to [45].
We start by showing that given the previous two assumptions, GP
is indeed equivalent to this secure classifier.
GP as a Secure Classifier An example for GPC as a secure
classifier is visualized in fig. 1a. The predictive mean of GPR is
composed of weighted labels, where the weight is the similarity
between the training points and the distance to the queried test point,
as formalized in eq. (2).
Throughout this analysis, we assume the values representing the
two classes to be 1 for class 1 and −1 for class 0 respectively.
When assumption two holds, the kernel matrix is the identity ma-
trix: the similarity between any two points is zero, and the similarity
of each point with itself is 1.0. A test point x ′ is at most close to a
single training point, here xn . We summarize:
y∗ = k(x ′,xn ) ∗ 1 ∗ yn , (6)
where 1 denotes the similarity from xn to itself; all other terms are
zero as k(x ′,xi ) = 0 iff i , n. This classifier is almost equivalent
to section 3.1, as it classifies each point if it is in the ρ-ball of any
training point.
To fulfill the equivalence, we define rejection for GPR (assump-
tion 1). We need to reject any test point for which k(x ′,xn ) ≤ ρ. The
minimum and maximum output of GPR is (due to the labels) either
1 = y1 or −1 = y0, thus we do not classify a sample iff
y∗ ∈ [−1 + τ0, 1 − τ1] , (7)
where we chose τ0 = τ1 = ρ to reject points further away than ρ. We
may, however, define a different thresholds (where 0.0 < τ < 1.0)
for the two classes or even each test point, if required.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1: Intuition of formal Analysis of GP. Bright and Dark
areas are classes, other areas (red) rejection areas. Black and
white points are training data. The axis are the two features. a
shows secure naive classifier, b, c and d different forms of gener-
alization in GPC. Plots are best seen in color.
Generalization and Secure Classifier Let us assume the second
assumption does not hold. As the similarity between some points is
not 0 anymore, they will jointly influence classification as visualized
in fig. 1 and thus generalize.
THEOREM 1. Learning in GPR involves classifying areas outside
the ρ-balls (generalization), or there is no improvement over GPR
with rejection and an identity matrix covariance, hence no learning
takes place.
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Proof To be classified, we need a classification output p > ρ or
p < −ρ. We start with the first case. We thus obtain prediction
p ≤
∑
i
(ρ − κi ) ∗ K−1i ∗ 1 , (8)
where K−1i is the sum over the inverted covariance matrix column
corresponding to point i. Before inversion, this column contains the
similarities between i and all other training points. So far, we have
ignored that we need a test point to obtain this prediction. Without
loss of generality, we pick x ′ which maximizes the above sum under
the restriction that x ′ is in none of the ρ-balls: hence ρ − κi , the
distance to ρ-balli is κi .
There are three cases. In the first, p ≥ ρ and we classify outside
the ρ-ball. In the second case, p = 0 or 0 < p < ρ. As we reasoned
about the maximal x ′, we know that there are no other points for
which p > ρ. Then GPR is still secure: no area outside the ρ-ball is
classified, as the output is below the defined threshold. It remains to
be shown, however, that there is no contradiction for the opposite
class. We proceed analogously with an x ′′ that is chosen to minimize
the sum. ■
Remark We used in the proof that the minimal output of a point
chosen to maximize the sum is zero. Analogously, the maximal
value when minimizing the sum is zero as well. This holds due to
the abating property of the kernel: As we move away from the data,
eventually all distances become zero, thus the sum is zero as well.
We conclude that generalization leads to classification in areas
which might enable test time attacks such as adversarial examples.
More intriguingly, such a secure classifier is highly vulnerable to
poisoning attacks: injection of a single point will guarantee classifi-
cation of points in its ρ-ball.
3.2 Model Stealing, Model extraction, and
Membership Inference
We now analyze GP’s vulnerability to model stealing and member-
ship inference. We first define these two goals of the attacker before
we carry out the formal analysis.
Model stealing. Given a trained GP with black box access
(only access to input and output of the model), the attacker
aims to find out which lengthscale was learned during or
determined before training and which training data was used.
Model extraction. Given a trained GP with black box access
(only access to input and output of the model), the attacker
aims to find out which lengthscale was learned during or
determined before training.
Membership inference. Given a trained GP with black box
access (only access to input and output of the model), the
attacker aims to learn whether one or several samples where
used to train the GP.
We will now refresh how a classification is computed in a GP
(introduced in eq. (2)), namely
y∗ = KTx ′K−1tr Ytr =
∑
i
k(x ′ − Xi ) ∗ K−1i ∗ Yi , (9)
where we iterate over the n training data points. Consider that k, as
depicted in eq. (3), is further parametrized using l and σ 2. When we
unfold this sum and add the observed output of a GP, we obtain an
Training data known
yes                     no
Lengthscales known
yes                     no
Lengthscales known
yes                     no
1 lengthscale done O(1) O(nd) >O(nd)
d lengthscales done O(d) O(nd) >O(n2d)
Model 
extraction
Membership 
inference
Model 
stealing
Figure 2: Complexity of model stealing and/or membership in-
ference on a Gaussian Process Model. We denote the minimal
complexity. The complete leak automatically leads to a more
complex nonlinear equation system, which we denoted here
with >.
equation system we can solve to carry out the previously defined
attacks.
To run a model extraction attack given the training data, we plug
in this data, observe the output of the GP and compute the resulting
linear equation system yielding the lengthscale values. We then
need either 2 points or d + 1, depending on whether the GP has one
adjustable lengthscale or d.
Analogously, to run a membership inference attack given the
lengthscales, we plug the lengthscales in this equation set, observe
the output of the GP and compute the resulting linear equation
system yielding the training data. We then need either n+ 1 points or
nd + 1, depending on whether the GP has one adjustable lengthscale
or d.
Finally, we consider to running a model stealing attack on the GP.
Then, however, the resulting equation system is not linear anymore,
and all we know is that we need certainly more than nd +1 or n2d +1
points. We summarize our findings in fig. 2.
Remark. there are some additional factors that might influence
the complexity of the computation. The values we determined should
therefore be perceived as lower bounds.
Kernel used. We assumed implicitly that we know which
kernel is used. In case this is not known, we might still set up
one equation system per kernel and then observe which one
is solvable.
Additional parameters. The RBF kernel is also parametrized
by variance σ (as depicted in eq. (3)), which can be assumed
to be a global constant, however. Depending on the kernel, all
resulting equation system might be nonlinear and the resulting
complexity higher.
Number of samples. We also assume to know the number
of used samples. The solution to this is however straight
forward: We may increase the number of assumed training
points, depending on whether the solution was unique or not.
5
Unknown data. A recomputed training data set is only of use
to an attacker if the features are known (for example in vision).
On some Malware data set, an additional step is needed to
determine how each feature relates to which property of the
actual Malware sample.
We conclude that model stealing and membership inference at-
tacks are analytically computable on a GP. Given these formal results,
we now investigate vulnerability empirically.
4 EMPIRICAL STUDY OF VULNERABILITY
We have shown in our formal analysis the principal vulnerability of
GP when targeted by either evasion, model stealing, model extrac-
tion, or membership inference. We have seen that for the latter three
attacks, when the attacker has no knowledge, the resulting equation
system was non-linear. As we will see now, the attacker can easily
determine some of this knowledge empirically, thereby obtaining a
much easier problem. Key ingredient to this analysis is the impact
the curvature of the decision function to vulnerability. This curvature
or the gradient of the RBF kernel (defined in eq. (3)) can be influ-
enced by choosing a lengthscale before training. Hence, GP thus
offers us an ideal setting to study the gradient of the classification
function wrt the input in relation to vulnerability. The usefulness
of this setting extends to evasion attacks, where curvature in other
models than GP is often influenced by regularization or mitigations.
GP allow us to study the effect of curvature of the decision function
on evasion in a direct, controlled manner.
We start with describing the models used in our evaluation. Once
we have described the setting, we focus on evasion attacks and then
start with evasion attacks, study model stealing and model extraction
and conclude the section investigating membership inference.
4.1 Experimental Setting
We describe the general setting all empirical studies share, and de-
scribe details jointly with the corresponding study. The code to
reproduce all the experiments is accessible at URL blinded for sub-
mission.
4.1.1 Data. We evaluate the classifier on a range of tasks, fo-
cusing on security settings such as Malware [2, 42] and Spam de-
tection [23]. Additionally, we use a loosely security related task:
fake banknote detection by [23]. We further consider the MNIST
benchmark data set [21] and the SVHN data set [29]. Finally, we
employ the two moons data set in two dimensions for visualization
purposes.
4.1.2 Implementation. We implement our experiments in Python
using GPy for the Gaussian Process approaches [16]. To obtain ad-
versarial examples, we use Tensorflow [1] and the Cleverhans library
1.0.0 [15] for DNN, and public implementations for all other at-
tacks [8, 17].
4.1.3 Setting. We train our GPC using RBF kernel with a
predefined lengthscale. This GPC is optimized until convergence or
for 100 iterations. For each task, we chose two lengthscales, both
achieving similar accuracy. We provide more details on how we
determined the two lengthscales used in our experiments in the
Appendix. and depict our choices with the resulting accuracies in
table 2.
Table 2: Number of samples used in training, lengthscales and
accuracies (rejection option (Accr ) if µ = 0).
short l long l
Data set n l Accr Acc l Accr Acc
Hidost 500 .5 98.4 98.4 1.9 97.7 99.6
Drebin 750 .5 54.4 94 1.9 94.8 94.8
Spam 500 .3 92.6 91.7 5 92.7 90.2
Bank 500 .3 100 100 2 100 100
MNIST91 500 1 98.9 98.3 8 99.5 99.5
MNIST38 500 1 93.4 93.4 8 97.4 97.1
SVHN91 1500 8 85.4 88.5 16 83.8 87.6
SVHN10 1500 8 88.7 88.7 16 88.7 88.7
4.2 Evasion Attacks
Given the gradient of the classification function, we expect that a
classifier (here GPC) with a long lengthscale miss-classifies fewer
adversarial examples: A larger perturbation δ is needed to cause the
same change in the output as compared to a steep curvature. To test
our hypothesis, we craft a range of transferred adversarial examples
from other methods. We use FGSM, JSMA and Carlini and Wagner’s
attacks for DNN, the linear SVM attack and GPFGS and GPJM
on a GPC substitute. Our intention is to study a range of attacks,
including optimized, unoptimized, one-step and iterative attacks as
well as different metrics (L0, L2, and L∞). We summarize all attacks
based on the Jacobian in JBM, and plot all attacks by Carlini and
Wagner according to the norm optimized (Lx ; for example L2 for
optimization of the L2-norm).
4.2.1 Setting. We compare the previously chosen lengthscales
by comparing their accuracies in absolute percent: a value of 5
indicates that a classified 95% and b 90% of adversarial examples
correctly, leading to a difference of 5 percent. In general, a value
above zero in the plot signifies that the shorter lengthscale classified
more data correctly (e.g., recovered the correct class before changing
the original, benign sample). Analogously, below zero, a longer
lengthscale (flat curvature) performed better.
4.2.2 Results. We plot the results of our experiments on all
datasets in fig. 3a. We observe that the correct classification is in
general higher when the lengthscale is shorter. In particular, for
attacks with global perturbation (ϵ > 0.01), a shorter lengthscale
performs better. For highly optimized attacks (for example L2), a
longer lengthscale is of advantage.
We additionally allow for a rejection option, as we previously
forced GPC to output a classification. Instead, we now reject a
sample if y∗ = 0: in this case, the test point is far away from the
training data. A short lengthscale might thus allow to reject more
abnormal data. We plot our results in fig. 3b. The results are similar
to the experiment without rejection option. We observe, however,
that now many cases where the long lengthscale was beneficial
disappeared: the correct classification was due to the default class
being, by chance, in favor of the correct classification. We thus
investigate rejection in general in fig. 4. Adding a rejection option
when using a long length-scale has no effect at all. For a short
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lengthscale, the effect is positive or neutral, and only negative two
cases. These two cases stem from the Hidost data set, which is highly
imbalanced: We observe that by chance the assignment of the forced
classification was in favor of the larger class.
To understand the effect of the lengthscale in more detail, we
investigate a toy example. We depict GPC with two different length-
scales on the two moons data set in fig. 5. Red in the picture denotes
the areas of rejection. We observe that using a long lengthscale, the
density mass is pushed away from the training data, and the classi-
fier is confident in areas where no training data was observed. We
illustrate this by denoting a possible one-step attack in the picture
overshooting the target class. Additionally, we add a possible multi-
step attack which is missclassified as the short lengthscale yields a
very unsteady decision boundary.
Our empirical results on the individual attacks confirm this intu-
ition: highly optimized attacks such as Carlini and Wagner’s attack
and some cases of other multi-step attacks based on the Jacobian
are classified correctly more often with a long lengthscale (bound-
ary areas), whereas for one-step attacks (ϵ) a shorter lengthscale is
beneficial.
4.2.3 Conclusion. We conclude from our experiments that
only classifiers with steep decision functions benefit from rejection.
We further observe that only altering the classifier’s curvature does
not alleviate vulnerability, but merely changes which attacks the
classifier is vulnerable to.
4.3 Model extraction
In the theoretical analysis, we considered analytic computation of
the lengthscale. In contrast, we now aim at approximating the length-
scale when we are only given the output of the GP on a set of points.
We then study in a second experiment in how far the used kernel of
the GP can be determined when similar black-box access is given to
the attacker.
4.3.1 Setting I. We pick the same lengthscales as before and
evaluate whether it is possible on a data set to determine the length-
scale of a victim GP by the attacker. In particular, we investigate the
feasibility to run binary search to obtain l : We aim to know whether
the distance between the labels shrinks as the lengthscale chosen by
the attacker, la , approaches the original lengthscale l . We evaluate
three settings: Training GPC on the same data as the victim, a mix
of the same and disjoint (50% same data) and disjoint data. In each
setting, we train 50 GPCs, starting with a lengthscale la = l/2 and
increasing the lengthscale in steps of (1/50)l . We then compute the
absolute differences between the outputs of the two trained GPCs
on hold out test data that was used by neither GPC in training.
4.3.2 Results I. We plot the results in fig. 6. In the case where
we use the same training data as the victim, we observe that since
the training of the GPC is deterministic, we can recover the length-
scale. As expected, The decrease for all data sets towards the original
lengthscale (l) is monotonic, with small exceptions on the SVHN
and Bank data sets when we use a high lengthscale. For a short
lengthscale, all distances decrease monotonically towards the origi-
nal l .
For a mixed data set (see middle plots of fig. 6), where 50% of
the points are taken from the training set, the results are much less
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(a) Forced Classification.
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(b) With Rejection Option.
Figure 3: Vulnerability and Curvature in GPC. Above zero de-
notes that more examples are correctly classified (or rejected)
by a GPC with a flat curvature. Below zero more example are
correctly classified or rejected when the curvature is steep.
clear. We still observe a general decrease towards l , however it is less
pronounced and does not hold for all data sets. For a long lengthscale,
the distance is smallest roughly around l except for SVHN and Spam,
where it remains constant. For Drebin, the distance seems shortest
around l + (l/2). In case of a short lengthscale, the results vary: for
some data sets (MNIST91, Bank) the distance is closest to l , For
others (including SVHN and Malware), the smallest distance occurs
at l/2.
In case of the disjoint data sets (bottom plots of fig. 6), the results
are even less pronounced. We observe a slight decrease towards the
original lengthscale, yet the average minimum is at a lengthscale that
is longer than the original one. In case of a short lengthscale, there
are no differences at all for the Malware data set. For the SVHN data
sets, the minimum is very close to l/2. In general, we conclude from
the plots that a lengthscale can be approximated using binary search.
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Figure 4: Vulnerability, Lengthscale and rejection option in
GPC. Above zero denotes that more examples are correctly clas-
sified or rejected by a GPC without a rejection option. Data sets
as in fig. 3.
Figure 5: Lengthscale and extrapolation of GPC on the two
moons data set. Left figure uses a lengthscale which is 12 times
the lengthscale of the right graph to emphasize the effect. We
add two possible attacks to emphasize different vulnerabilities.
More concretely, the estimate is close when the original length-
scale is long: The difference to the original lengthscale is then
between 0.006l and 0.008l . More concretely, this corresponds to
wrongly estimating the largest lengthscale of SVHN by 1.28 (17.28
instead of 16.0) or the smallest (Bank) by 0.16 (estimating 2.16 in-
stead of 2.0). For a short lengthscale, the estimate for SVHN is far
away from the original lengthscale around 4 (at 4.48 instead of 8).
For all other data sets except Malware, the estimate is as accurate as
for a long lengthscale.
4.3.3 Setting II. We pick the same lengthscales as before. The
goal of the attacker is to determine the kernel used in a black-box
GPC. To this end, we train different GPCs, each using a different
kernel (for example linear, sparse, polynomial, or RBF kernel with
several learned lengthscales). The attacker then compares, as in the
previous setting, the absolute distance of the output of two GPCs on
some unseen test data. To study a worst case scenario, the attacker
knows which training data is used by the victim.
4.3.4 Results II. The hypothesis is that if the kernel is similar,
the distances between the outputs are smaller, thereby allowing
to deduce which kernel was used. Yet, our results show that for
neither short nor long lengthscales, we observe a clear trend that the
distances to RBF, the original kernel, are smallest. The results are
plotted in fig. 7, where we depict the mean over the three settings
and the standard deviation as error bars.
In case of short lengthscales, the distance are often similar in all
settings (Malware, Drebin, SVHN10). In the other cases (SVHN91,
both MNIST, bank, spam), RBF exhibits the lowest distances, but
the distance are close to the ones of other kernels. The only data set
where the kernel is correctly determined is the bank data set.
In contrast to the short lengthscale, we now observe that the dis-
tances vary strongly between the settings. Yet, the shortest distances
points often to the polynomial kernel (bank, MNIST91) or are simi-
lar across different kernels. An example are linear and RBF kernel
for spam, or polynomial and linear kernel for SVHN91.
4.3.5 Conclusion. We conclude that empirically, the length-
scale can be recovered easily (as in the analytic case) if the training
data is known. Yet, the empirical solution requires binary search,
whereas the analytic solution is constant in the case investigated.
Otherwise, the attacker can reasonably well approximate the length-
scale given that the targeted GPC has a long lengthscale. The kernel,
however, can not be deduced if we compare the output of differently
trained GPs, even if the training data is known.
4.4 Membership Inference
We now investigate how well an attacker can empirically deduce
which points were used in training. First, we study the general setting,
and then investigate particular settings influencing the attackers
success, such as overfitting, distribution drift, and sparse features.
In an effort to study a worst case scenario, the attacker has an
oracle that labels a large fraction of the points used in training by
the victim GPC as such. The attacker uses this data to train a fresh
classifier that predicts for unseen data points whether they were used
in training.
4.4.1 Setting. The victim GPCs are trained using the same
lengthscales as before. We then build a dataset using the output
(specified below) of the GPC and labels that indicate whether a
data point was used in training or not. We split the resulting dataset
randomly in training and a separate test set of 50 points which
we compute the reported accuracy on. We further provide random
guess accuracy as a baseline. The training data is used to train
a fresh classifier. We tested DNN, decision trees, random forests
and AdaBoost classifiers. As the random forest classifier performed
consistently best, all accuracies in this section are computed using
random forests. The success of this classifier is intuitive: it easily
splits a single feature in many small subsets, as needed in this case.
4.4.2 Results. We run several experiments, each correspond-
ing to different input the attacker uses to train on.
where we train random forests only on predictive mean or vari-
ance without (fig. 8a) or including the samples X used to train the
GPC (fig. 8b). We further train on both variance and mean or the
unnormalized, latent mean of GP and depict the results in fig. 8c.
For the first experiment, we train random forests only on predic-
tive mean or variance without the corresponding samples X . The
results are depicted in (fig. 8a). Overall, using only the predictive
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(b) Long l , same data.
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(c) Short l , mixed data.
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(d) Long l , mixed data.
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(e) Short l , disjoint data.
l/2 l l+ (l/2)
(f) Long l , disjoint data.
Figure 6: Normalized, absolute differences in output stacked for different data sets when a GP’s lengthscale approaches the length-
scale of the victim (l denotes the point of equivalence).
9
Malware
SVHN91
SVHN10
Drebin
Spam
Bank
MNIST91
MNIST38
linear poly sparse RBF
kernel compared to RBF
101
102
103
104
L
1
di
st
an
ce
s
be
tw
ee
n
ou
tp
ut
s
(a) Short l .
linear poly sparse RBF
kernel compared to RBF
101
102
103
104
L
1
di
st
an
ce
s
be
tw
ee
n
ou
tp
ut
s
(b) Long l .
Figure 7: Unnormalized distances in output when training GP’s
with different kernels (x-axis) on different data sets (colors).
RBF is the kernel used by the victim.
mean (dots) and a long lengthscale (larger markers in the plots), all
data sets are not vulnerable, with the exception of the two Malware
data sets.
In the second experiment, we provide the learner more informa-
tion: it trains also on the data training samples X of the GPC. These
results are depicted in fig. 8b. We observe results similar to the first
experiment, with the exception that the attacker is now successful in
all cases on SVHN tasks. In case of the Malware and MNIST tasks,
the accuracy decreases slightly.
In the third experiment, the attacker trains either on mean and
variance (squares) or the unnormalized, latent mean (stars). We
depict the results in fig. 8c. The attacker succeeds in both cases
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(a) Classifier trained on variance (triangles) or mean (dots).
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(b) Classifier trained on variance (triangles) or mean (dots) and X .
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(c) Classifier trained on mean and variance (square) or latent mean
(star).
Figure 8: Lengthscale and membership inference on GPC. Big-
ger symbols denote a long lengthscale of targeted GPC, small
symbols a short lengthscale. Random Guess Accuracy is de-
noted by x.
on all SVHN tasks or when using a small lengthscale, with the
exception of non-vision tasks. The attacker is also successful on the
Malware data sets with a long lengthscale.
To summarize, we observe that on the Bank and Spam data sets,
the attack is never successful. Whereas in general a shorter length-
scale is more vulnerable, this trend is inverted on the Malware data
sets: here, a short lengthscale benefits the defender. Before we focus
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on these cases, however, we investigate what enables the attacks
on the SVHN data and why a short lengthscale is beneficial for the
adversary.
4.4.3 Overfitting and Distribution Drift. We now investigate
whether the success of the attack depends on overfitting or distribu-
tion drift. For overfitting, we compare training and test accuracies. In
case of distribution drift, we measure the standard deviation over the
distances between training and test data. Since the distance measure
is learned and adapted in GP, we expect the test data to cause larger
variance in these values if the data is distributed differently.
Except for the Bank, Spam and SVHN data sets, we observe that
the training accuracy always reaches 100% and is higher than test
accuracy. For the Bank data, test accuracy is also 100% and thus not
lower than train accuracy. In case of the spam and SVHN data, train
accuracy is below 100%. For all data sets except Bank, the difference
between test and train accuracy is smaller for a longer lengthscale.
We conclude that slight overfitting occurs at short lengthscales, and
enables the membership inference attacks.
For all SVHN settings and MNIST8 with a small lengthscale, the
variance between training and test data is two magnitudes larger than
among either training or test data. We conclude that the attack was
enabled as training and test data were different from the perspective
of GPC. This might imply that the model is actually not expressive
enough to model the data in detail.
4.4.4 Sparse Data. We have so far explained all successful
attack, leaving open only the two Malware datasets, Hidost and
Drebin, unexplained. Both data sets share the high dimensionality
and sparsity, which might influence the success of the attack. To
evaluate this claim, train a GPC using inducing variables (GPy’s
sparse GPC) to account for the sparse data. We repeat the attack
as described in the previous experiments. We depict the results of
the same settings as in the previous study in fig. 9. We observe that
the accuracy is now on all settings close to a random guess, with
the exception of a short lengthscale for Hidost on mean or variance,
latent mean, or mean and variance. For Drebin, we observe a very
small improvement over random guess when a short lengthscale is
used and the attacker accesses mean and variance.
4.4.5 Conclusion. We observe that even assuming a very strong
attacker, the attacker is not successful when the applied GPC and
data are properly configured: there is no distribution drift, overfitting
and sparse data is properly taken care of. This is somewhat expected:
in contrast to other algorithms such as DNN, a GP is only punished
during training when a prediction is wrong, in contrast to requiring
(as in DNN) very high confidence on the training data.
5 RELATED WORK
We first review the relationship between GP and Deep learning in
general, then adversarial learning in the Bayesian context. After-
wards, we turn to other formal methods in the context of adversarial
learning. We then review regularization and mitigations in adversar-
ial ML that are related to our empirical study of evasion attacks. To
conclude, we review other works in Models Stealing and Member-
ship inference.
Gaussian Processes and Deep Learning. Albeit superficially
unconnected, the relationship between GP and deep neural networks
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Figure 9: Accuracy of membership inference depending on the
lengthscale on a sparse GPC. Bigger symbols denote a long
lengthscale of targeted GPC, small symbols a short lengthscale.
Random Guess Accuracy is denoted by x. Left plot: Classifier
trained on variance (triangles) or mean (dots). Middle: trained
as is the previous setting, but also on input samples X . Right:
classifier trained on mean and variance (square) or latent mean
(star). Random guess is in all plots denoted as x .
is studied by Neal [28]. To gain more understanding, recent ap-
proaches by Matthews et al. [10] and Lee et al. [22] represent DNN
with infinite layers as Gaussian Processes. Garriga-Alonso et al. [13]
extend this finding to convolutional networks.
Bayesian Learning and Adversarial Learning. Other works
such as Bradshaw et al. [6] and Rawat et al. [35] investigate adver-
sarial learning in the context of the Bayesian framework. Yet, they
do not focus on GP specifically. Grosse et al. [17] propose test time
attacks on GP and show that Bayesian model uncertainty is not a
reliable defense to evasion attacks. All of them, however, take an
empirical approach and further only investigate evasion attacks.
Formal Approaches to Adversarial Machine Learning. Wang
et al. [45] show the vulnerability for the k-nearest-neighbor classi-
fier, where they define robustness given a ρ-ball, analogous to our
approach. Yet, their approach works in the infinite sample limit,
and they propose deletion of points as countermeasure. Fawzi et
al. [12] show general vulnerability for all classifiers. Further, a ra-
dius classifier is also introduced in Tanay et al. [43], however in
context of SVM: the authors focus on decision plane classification
without rejection option. In contrast, we work on non-linear methods
without decision planes, outline the importance of rejection, and
additionally analyze model stealing and membership inference. we
thereby outline relationships between robustness among different
methods.
Regularization, Evasion Vulnerability, and Mitigations. We
are not the first to analyze the curvature of the classifier function in
context of test-time attacks. Russu et al. [36] show a direct relation-
ship between the gradient of a linear model and its vulnerability. Also
previous defenses for DNN, as for example introduced by Raghu-
nathan et al. [33], can be linked to regularization. In contrast, we
find evidence that in non-linear methods, regularization will change,
not alleviate the problem of vulnerability to evasion attacks.
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Table 3: Summary of our results concerning GP’s vulnerability towards differ-
ent test-time attacks.
evasion + rejection model stealing model extraction membership inference
analytic iff learned,
hard vulnerable vulnerable
vulnerability vulnerable
steep curvature some benefits eased via mem-
robust vulnerable
short lengthscale from rejection bership inference
flat curvature
vulnerable
eased via
vulnerable robust
long lengthscale model extraction
Another line of work in DNN has a strong relation to the secure
classifier used in our theoretical analysis. Adversarial training, as
proposed by Madry et al. [24] and Wong et al. [46] aim directly
at training the network to output the same class in a ρ-ball around
each training point. Yet these approaches do not consider a reject
option, which has however been done empirically by Melis et al. [26].
Further, Bendale and Boult [4] investigate open set recognition. We
connect both ideas, rejection and ρ-balls, in our work.
Model Stealing, Model Extraction and Membership Inference.
Copying the model without consent of the owner has been introduced
by Papernot et al. [31] and Tramèr et al. [44]. Additionally, Oh et al.
[30] where the first ones to propose particular attacks that allow to
deduce hyper-parameter such as the usage of dropout in the training
of a neural network. Further, Shokri et al. [39] and Salem et al. [37]
deal with the extraction of the training data or properties thereof.
Yet, these approaches mainly target deep neural network models. We
support and confirm findings from these works, yet we show that
a GP which is secure towards membership inference easily leaks
the models parameters. We further show how distribution drift in-
fluences membership inference. Dealing with distribution drift is an
open research question on it own[20].
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the security of GP at test time, in-
cluding its vulnerability towards evasion, model stealing, model
extraction, and membership inference attacks. We studied these set-
tings both formally and empirically. Our formal analysis is two-fold:
We first show that static security guarantees during test time, for
example a fixed radius around training data points, are opposed to
learning. Our finding emphasizes the necessity of rejection in secure
learning. Additionally, we argue that an attacker can represent a GP
as a system of linear equations, thereby recomputing parameters
learned or the data used during training, given that she can query the
model linearly in dimensionality of the data. Our analysis further
outlines the close relation of model stealing, model extraction, and
membership inference on GP.
We further leveraged the property of GP to fit a model with a
predefined curvature, and conducted an empirical study on four se-
curity and two vision data sets. We summarize our results briefly in
table 3, where we skip the fact that model stealing eases evasion. In
the case of such evasion attacks, or adversarial examples, the cur-
vature merely affects whether highly optimized or one-step attacks
succeed. Concerning model stealing, we find that the lengthscale can
be estimated empirically as well as determined analytically, where
it is easier to estimate when the curvature is flat (or the lengthscale
is long). Independent from the lengthscale, we conclude that it is
not possible to empirically deduce the used kernel. For membership
inference, we show that the success of the attack is influenced by
measurable factors such as a steep gradient, overfitting or distribu-
tion drift. We conclude that GP can be protected against such an
attack when properly configured (e.g. no overfitting or distribution
drift, taking care of sparse features, choosing the lengthscale appro-
priately). Intriguingly, a short lengthscale leaks the data, whereas a
long lengthscale leaks the parameters of the GP. Since either can be
used to retrieve the other, the algorithm leaks both at a low number
of queries.
Our findings emphasize that attack vectors on learning should not
be seen in isolation, but also studied in relation to each other, as a
mitigation towards one attack might enable or ease another attack.
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LENGTHSCALE AND ACCURACY
To determine the two lengthscales used throughout the paper, we
trained a range of GPCs on each data set. We varied the lengthscale
in small steps between 0.0 and 2.0 in steps of 0.01 and between 2.0
and 151.0 in steps of 1.0. We report the resulting accuracies and
AUC with all rejections thresholds in fig. 10. This figures include
an additional data set Credit, which was later excluded as we found
the accuracy to vary strongly (by 10%) if the split between test and
training data was altered.
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Figure 10: Accuracy and variations of lengthscales in GP. Accuracies are lines, dotted lines correspond to AUC (labels on the left
side).
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